![]() In the second chapter, I analyze the theories of knowledge of Ockham and Chatton considering, especially, the conclusions of the first chapter, but also considering two contemporary theories of knowledge: reliabilism and externalism. This analysis has shown deep differences between Ockham and Chatton’s philosophical anthropologies on the one hand, and on the other hand, between their naturalistic approaches to explain how mental states are caused. In the first chapter of my thesis, I analyze the ontological status of mental states from two perspectives: that of the nature of mental states and that of the way they are caused. This concerns the ontological status of mental states according to Ockham and Chatton. The problem of the introspective cognition of mental states leads to a first question. Chatton has always considered that the content of certain mental states must be accessible immediately. Ockham considered, in his early writings, that the content of some mental states is accessible in a mediate way, and, in his later writings, that some content is accessible in an immediate way. My main hypothesis is that the two theories are distinguished by different explanations for the introspective cognition of the content of mental states. The aim of my research is to reconstruct the theories of Ockham and Chatton on reflexive knowledge and compare them to bring about both the areas of agreement and the points of divergence. The problem of the introspective cognition of our own mental states – or reflexive knowledge – is one of those problems. William of Ockham and Walter Chatton, two English philosophers from the Fourteenth Century, reflected on several common issues in disparate philosophical perspectives.
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